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Abstract
Objectives This paper explores the underlying
motivations and strategies of formal small and mediumsized formal private for-profit sector hospitals and clinics
in urban Bangladesh and their implications for quality and
access.
Methods This exploratory qualitative study was
conducted in Dhaka, Sylhet and Khulna City Corporations.
Data collection methods included key informant interviews
(20) with government and private sector leaders, in-depth
interviews (30) with clinic owners, managers and providers
and exit interviews (30) with healthcare clients.
Results Profit generation is a driving force behind entry
into the private healthcare business and the provision
of services. However, non-financial motivations are
also emphasised such as aspirations to serve the
disadvantaged, personal ambition, desire for greater social
status, obligations to continue family business and adverse
family events. The discussion of private sector motivations
and strategies is framed using the Business Policy Model.
This model is comprised of three components: products
and services, and efforts to make these attractive
including patient-friendly discounts and service-packages,
and building ‘good’ doctor-patient relationships; the
market environment, cultivated using medical brokers
and referral fees to bring in fresh clientele, and receipt
of pharmaceutical incentives; and finally, organisational
capabilities, in this case overcoming human resource
shortages by relying on medical staff from the public
sector, consultant specialists, on-call and less experienced
doctors in training, unqualified nursing staff and referring
complicated cases to public facilities.
Conclusions In the context of low public sector capacity
and growing healthcare demands in urban Bangladesh,
private for-profit engagement is critical to achieving
universal health coverage (UHC). Given the informality of
the sector, the nascent state of healthcare financing, and
a weak regulatory framework, the process of engagement
must be gradual. Further research is needed to explore
how engagement in UHC can be enabled while maintaining
profitability. Incentives that support private sector efforts to
improve quality, affordability and accountability are a first
step in building this relationship.

Strengths and limitations of this study
►► This exploratory study is among the first in

Bangladesh to query the underlying motivations and
strategies of the urban private for-profit sector.
►► The study employs qualitative methods to enable indepth understanding of factors influencing healthcare practices as reported by private facility owners
and providers.
►► A limitation of the study was the unwillingness of
certain respondents to disclose strategies they
employ to grow and flourish their private sector
business.

Introduction
The Sustainable Development Goal 3 (SDG3)
of reaching universal health coverage (UHC)
by 2030 is challenging in pluralistic healthcare
systems such as Bangladesh.1 The country
is also urbanising rapidly as reflected in an
average urban population growth rate of 3%
per year and an astonishing 7% per year in
poor informal settlements.2 3 If these trends
continue, by 2040, over half of Bangladesh’s
total population will reside in urban areas.4
In this context, challenges to achieving
UHC are amplified as demand for services
increases, and the healthcare market shifts
towards the private sector.5 6 In Bangladesh,
reaching the SDG target 3.7—ensuring every
person has access to affordable quality healthcare services, including financial risk protection—is particularly daunting given that 67%
of national health expenditure is already
out of pocket.7 However, Bangladesh is also
a country that routinely defies expectations,
witnessed in its spectacular health achievements over the last four decades in terms of
reductions in total fertility rate and rates of
maternal, infant and childhood mortality.8
Although some of this success may be due to
coverage of publicly financed free services,9
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a project basis18 19 with a predominant focus on maternal
and child health.20 Filling the gap in public primary
services is the urban private sector that accounts for over
90% of healthcare facilities (online supplementary annex
1) in urban areas.20 Nationally, data from the Directorate
General Health Services show an increase in the number
of registered private for-profit facilities from 1038 in 2007
to 5023 in 2017,21 22 reflecting both a rise in demand for
services and the inability of the public sector to generate
sufficient supply on its own. Yet even within so-called
formal facilities, irregular practices are common.
For example, recent evidence from a comprehensive
mapping of all health facilities in Sylhet City Corporation
found that 40% of private clinics, hospitals and diagnostic
centres had not fully complied with annual registration
requirements.23
Despite the size of the urban private for-profit sector
and its critical role in health service delivery in Bangladesh, relatively little is known about its underlying motivations and business strategies. In this study, we focus on
small and medium-sized formal private for-profit health
facilities (between 10 and 150 bed capacity) given their
substantial urban presence. In Dhaka alone, they represent about 55% of all hospitals and clinics, with public
and NGO sector facilities accounting for the remaining
19% and 26%, respectively.20 With the broader goal of
enabling UHC in urban areas, our objectives are: (1) to
explore the underlying motivations of owners, managers
and providers entering into and sustaining activities in
the small and medium-sized formal for-profit private
healthcare business and (2) to understand how the business strategies and incentives governing the small and
medium-sized formal for-profit private sector enable or
hinder quality and financial access.
To frame our exploration of business motivations
and strategies, we draw on the Business Policy Model
(BPM),24 the basic concepts of which still undergird
the logic of current corporate strategy analysis.25 BPM
is made up of three basic elements—products/markets,
the market environment and organisational capabilities—that interact to determine how a private sector
business performs. Specifically, the model specifies
how the financial success of a particular good or service
offered by a private sector business is a function of its
alignment with the market environment and the organisation’s capabilities. In the case of healthcare provision,
the goal of the private for-profit sector is to ensure that
its products or services constitute the most ‘profitable
value-proposition’ in the current market environment,
that the market shows sufficient long-term demand for
those services and that the services offered align with
organisational capabilities to add value. Based on this
framework, we will consider how urban small and medium-sized private owners, managers and providers strategise around products, markets and capabilities to ensure
success in sustaining and growing their healthcare business. Of particular interest is how these strategies impact
quality and access by the urban poor.
Adams AM, et al. BMJ Open 2019;9:e026586. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026586
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and its role in reducing use-inequities,10 the contribution
of private healthcare sector remains poorly understood.
This understanding is complicated by the widespread
phenomenon of dual practice, whereby a large proportion of public sector providers are also involved in private
practice to supplement income.11 12 Given its primary
for-profit orientation, there is widespread scepticism
about the potential contribution of the private sector
towards UHC. In the absence of strong regulatory capacity
on the part of the state, these concerns relate to inappropriate or unnecessary care, inequitable access due to
escalating costs and poor quality of care. As a result, the
public sector continues to be the major focus of Government efforts towards UHC targets.13
However, recent data suggest that neglect of this
sector is short sighted. For example, the 2016 Bangladesh Maternal Mortality Survey (BMMS) shows that for
obstetric complications, only 25.5% of women visited
public sector facilities and the rest used some kind of
private facility or informal provider as a first source of
care.14 The use of the private sector for delivery services
is also increasing. According to BMMS data, only 2.6%
of mothers delivered in private sector facilities in 2001,
rising to 11.3% in 2010 and 29% in 2016, whereas public
sector delivery trended from 5.8% (2001) to 14% (2016)
over the same period.14 The contribution of the private
sector to the explosive growth of C-section delivery is
particularly concerning. According to 2011 Bangladesh
Demographic and Health Survey data, more than half of
all C-sections took place in private sector facilities, and
among deliveries occurring in private facilities, 72% were
by C-section.15 A nationwide rise in C-section rates from
17% in 2011 to 23% in 201416 implies that the private
sector share is continuing to increase.
In Bangladesh, the private for-profit sector in health
consists of profit-oriented businesses that charge healthcare consumers above actual service costs. The sector
includes a heterogenous set of providers that vary in
the degree to which they operate within or outside
the purview of regulation, registration or oversight by
government or professional bodies or possess formally
recognised training. At one end of this spectrum are
formal private for-profit hospitals and clinics offering
diagnostics and both general and specialised medical
treatment including surgical procedures, while at the
other, unqualified doctors or drug sellers purvey pharmaceuticals whether needed or not.13 17
In urban areas, the density of private sector services is
remarkable. Unlike rural Bangladesh where government
healthcare infrastructure is available at district, subdistrict and community levels, in urban areas, the public
health system is limited to a handful of poor functioning
urban dispensaries and secondary and tertiary hospitals
operated by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
Designated responsible for urban primary healthcare yet
lacking implementation capacity, the Ministry of Local
Government has contracted out primary healthcare
services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on
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Study site
Three cities were purposively selected to capture a
wide range of performance on key indicators of healthcare access and utilisation such as rates of vaccination coverage, Antenatal Care (ANC) coverage, child
mortality and maternal mortality.15 These were: Dhaka,
the national capital of Bangladesh, and among the fastest
growing megacities in the world; Khulna, a divisional
capital located in a district considered high performing
in terms of key health indicators; and Sylhet, a divisional
capital in one of the poorest health-performing districts
in the country. Within each of these cities, we focus individuals involved in small to medium-sized licenced and
registered (as reported) private for-profit healthcare
businesses (10–150 beds) in the roles of owner, manager,
healthcare provider and patient.
Study methods and sampling strategy
A total of 80 respondents were interviewed from
September 2013 to March 2014. In each city, key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with a purposive
sample of local officials from the Ministry of Health, the
Bangladesh Medical & Dental Council, the Bangladesh
Medical Association, the pharmaceutical industry as well
as members of the Private Clinic Owner’s Association. At
the end of each KII, respondents were asked to recommend the names of small and medium-sized private
clinic owners and providers who might be willing to
participate in in-depth interviews (IDIs). This snowball
sampling method helped identify potential respondents
working in a sector that is otherwise difficult to access. IDI
respondents included private healthcare facility owners,
managers and providers. Using a purposive sampling
strategy, inpatient and outpatient exit interviews were also
performed to document client experiences in the same
Table 1 Types and numbers of interviews conducted in
each study site
Types of respondents

Dhaka Sylhet Khulna Total

Key informants
For-profit health facility
owners and managers

5
5

7
5

8
6

20
16

For-profit service providers

4

5

5

14

Exit interviews with
inpatients

5

5

5

15

Exit interviews with
outpatients
Total

5

5

5

15

24

27

29

80
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facilities in which IDIs were conducted. Table 1 displays
the types and numbers of interviews conducted in each
study sites.
Data collection
Guided by two supervisors with extensive field experience
and expertise in qualitative methods and analysis, data
collection was performed by 12 social science researchers.
Semistructured KII and IDI guidelines were prepared for
different groups of respondents. KIIs explored urban
health challenges; the range of private care providers
and services provided; quality of care, dual practice
and referral mechanisms; as well as known strategies
to maintain profitability including incentives provided
by pharmaceutical companies. IDIs with private healthcare owners, managers and providers considered their
underlying motivations in choosing and remaining in the
sector; services provided and available human resources;
linkages with other formal providers, pharmaceutical
representatives and brokers; typical referral mechanisms;
sustainability and quality of care practices; and challenges
and suggestions for better coordination with the public
sector.
Exit interviews elicited narratives concerning the
experience and satisfaction of healthcare consumers
frequenting private sector facilities in terms of the quality
and affordability of services received and whether they
intended to return to the same facility in future. In each
city, senior researchers tapped into existing networks to
identify a number of well-positioned key informants for
interview, many of whom provided support in identifying
respondents and facilitating access. These existing relationships were crucial to entrée, rapport building and
trust in a sector that is typically closed to outsiders.
Two or three researchers were involved in each interview: a facilitator and one or two note-takers. In addition to detailed hand-written field notes, interviews were
recorded digitally. Recordings were transcribed verbatim
into Bangla as soon as possible following data collection,
and field notes and observations were written up in the
same time frame. Bangla transcripts were translated into
English by skilled translators, and a subsample of translated transcripts were reviewed and back translated by
senior researchers to cross-check data fidelity.
Data analysis
Framework analysis was performed using codes and data
displays to systematically examine emerging patterns and
themes.26 A team approach to analysis was employed to
minimise individual bias with multiple analysts involved
in coding and interpreting data. To begin, each transcript was coded independently on hard copy by two
researchers. Initially, seven ‘a priori codes’ were defined
and later inductive codes were also included in the
coding framework. After assessing intracoder and intercoder reliability by having two analysts independently
code the same sections of text, codes were applied by the
research team using Atlas-ti. Code reports were generated
3
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Methods
Study design
This exploratory qualitative study was conducted in three
city corporations in Bangladesh and involved interviews
with government and private sector leaders, formal
private for-profit healthcare actors and consumers of
these services.
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Ethical considerations
Prior to interview, written informed consent to participate in the study was obtained from each respondent,
as well as permission to be audio-recorded. All elements
of consent were described to study respondents orally to
clarify the purpose of the research, the measures undertaken to ensure confidentiality and their right to withdraw
from the interview at any time for any reason. Arrangements for the place and time of interview were organised
in advance according to the respondent’s convenience
and privacy.
Patient and public involvement
The research questions and outcome measures of this
study were identified with the participation of a technical
advisory group composed of formal healthcare owners,
managers and providers, policy makers and academics.
Neither patients nor the public were involved in study
design. Patient involvement was limited to participation in
exit interviews that captured their experiences and satisfaction with care received from formal private for-profit
clinics. Study findings were shared and discussed through
a series of dissemination workshops involving international and bilateral donors, researchers, government
officials from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
involved in hospital services management, planning and
quality improvement, as well as leaders from professional
medical, nursing and private clinic associations.

Results
Motivations of private healthcare owners, managers and
providers
To understand the motivations underlying the involvement of private sector actors in the healthcare market,
respondents were asked to describe how they came to be
involved in the sector and their reasons for sustaining
their business. Two groups of motivational factors
emerged from analysis: financial and personal.
The monetary rewards associated with running a
successful healthcare business were a strong pull factor
motivating entry into the private sector. The industry was
widely perceived as financially lucrative and therefore an
appealing professional choice. Formal for-profit business
owners described how profit is a central motivation and
that the provision of quality care is critical to ensuring
‘good’ business, that is, financial gain. One doctor in
Sylhet explained, ‘the main reason I entered the private sector
was business. I worked in a small town near Dhaka city. 55–60
private clinics are there in that small town. All are running
well, also gaining profit…’. They also explained how profit
was generated when necessary services are provided that
4

the public sector is unable to furnish due to insufficient
capacity.
There was also a general assumption that working as
a doctor in the private sector ensured financial security
given the rising demand for services in urban areas. Many
providers further described how the opportunity for
a stable income for themselves and their families was a
key reason for joining and remaining in the profession.
According to one private provider in Khulna: ‘The thing
that attracted me to this profession is financial solvency… I
assumed that I will have a superior financial status and I
(sustained) that by joining this profession’.
In addition to financial interests, personal motivations
also played a role in entering the private healthcare profession. First among these was the desire to furnish needed
services to the public and the personal fulfilment that
this yields. A number of respondents noted a particular
concern for the poor, the vulnerable and the disadvantaged who frequently lack access to quality care. For these
providers, a commitment to rectify these inequities was
identified as an impetus for entering the private healthcare sector and a reason for continuing their professional
engagement.
At the other end of the spectrum was personal ambition. For some respondents, the desire for social status
associated with a career in healthcare, and conferred to
specialist doctors in particular, was an important factor
motivating their decision to engage in private sector
practice. Others indicated their aspirations to be part of
a challenging, fast-growing profession. Frequent reference was also made to the expectations and ambitions of
family members. Pressures from family to pursue private
medical practice were widely cited, largely due to the
perceived status and income it commands, or because an
existing family business needed to be sustained. As one
provider from Khulna explained: ‘This business is in our
family. The forefathers of my father used to run it, after them, my
father. I practiced with my father for a very long time, then after
(his) death I took charge’.
In a number of instances particular personal circumstances compelled entry into the private healthcare
market. One clinic owner and provider described his decision to start a clinic following his mother’s death and his
desire to do something concrete in her memory: ‘When I
started my fourth year of medical school, my mother died. At that
time, I couldn’t take care of my mother due to my studies. I established this clinic in (her) name’. Similarly, a clinic manager
in Dhaka claimed that an experience with poor quality
healthcare prompted the creation of the facility in which
he worked: ‘Our Director’s child died in a renowned hospital
of Bangladesh … because of the carelessness of the doctors and
nurses. So, our Director decided to build a NICU where patients
will not face such kinds of carelessness’.
Interesting in these narratives was the spectrum of
reasons why our respondents came to be involved in the
private healthcare sector ranging from the profit-seeking
motivations we typically associate with the sector to a
desire to serve the public. Recognising this complexity of
Adams AM, et al. BMJ Open 2019;9:e026586. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026586
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based on ‘a priori’ themes and other inductive codes to
facilitate the identification of patterns and themes. Data
displays were also used to visualise patterns across categories and concepts, and permit systematic analysis.
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Business strategies of private healthcare owners, managers
and providers
Private formal health sector actors reported multiple
strategies to ensure business success and sustainability.
These strategies helped them increase client flow and
satisfaction and derive profits out of the services provided.
Adapting the BPM to the context of private sector healthcare, we consider these strategies under the broad headings of products and services, the market environment
and organisational capabilities. A particular interest in
this exploration is how strategies in these areas can either
facilitate or hinder access by the urban poor.
Products/services
A number of strategies were identified whereby for-profit
healthcare businesses aimed to make their services
more appealing to both current and potential clientele.
One such strategy was the use of patient discounts. The
majority of private practitioners interviewed reported
using discounts to entice new patients and to reward
existing client loyalty. However, philanthropic motivations were also common, with many private sector clinics
offering discounts to allow poorer patients access to
services they otherwise could not afford. As one private
sector provider explained:
There is not a fixed percent, but they do so according
to the (financial) state of the patient… Normally we
grant 15% discounts for tests and 10% for the bed
rent. Sometimes we have to give more – even above
50%.
Another widespread strategy was the provision of health
packages that bundled services and products together
at a fixed price for procedures such as C-section and
appendicectomy surgery. This decreased costs to patients
compared with the cumulative price of individual services
and, in some instances, created opportunity for negotiation between clinics and clients. While this practice was
reported to increase patient flow, in certain instances,
they had detrimental financial consequences especially
when patient complications required additional, unanticipated tests and procedures that the package did not
include, yet the clinic was obliged to cover.
Finally, almost all private providers mentioned the
importance of cultivating a positive and trusting doctor–
patient relationship as crucial to ensuring client loyalty
and continuity of care. Respondents described efforts
made within the clinical setting to make patients feel
valued and comfortable, recognising that client perceptions of provider behaviour and attitudes are important
determinants of whether they adhere to treatment or
return for subsequent visits. As explained by a doctor in
Sylhet:
Adams AM, et al. BMJ Open 2019;9:e026586. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026586

While the first aim is that the patient gets cured, my
behaviour is also important… We, the doctors… tell
our students that not all diseases are organic. Some
are psychosomatic (and hence) our behaviour with
patients is a major factor in providing care. The patient (must) have faith in a doctor that he will be
cured … The doctor must create such faith through
conversations and discussion time (with patients) …
Our findings revealed that positive perceptions of
provider conduct were not contingent on the duration of wait time for consultation, nor the length of the
provider–patient interaction. Interviews with patients
exiting private facilities revealed that even though
average consultation times were only 6–7 min in length
and wait times varied between 5 min and 2 hours and 30
min, reports of patient satisfaction with private sector
services were uniformly positive. Many noted their provider’s efforts to make them feel comfortable and the quality
of services received. As described by one patient leaving a
private clinic in Khulna: ‘The quality of service is good here…
much better than other facilities. The (doctor’s) behaviour is very
good… he examined me carefully, the nurses, duty doctors and
the doctor visited me regularly…’.
The provision of extended service hours was another
strategy that was widely perceived to offer a competitive
advantage over the daytime operations of NGO clinics by
offering greater access to the working population.
Market environment
A number of strategies were used to maintain market
position and cultivate demand for private sector services.
Among these was reliance on medical brokers or Dalals as
a means to ensure patient flow. Employed by many private
healthcare facilities to divert or convince clients to use
their services, Dalals typically operate near the entrance
of public hospitals or in areas of the city where new
migrants to the city first settle. A number of respondents
also indicated that informal providers such as drug sellers
and unlicenced or ‘village’ doctors may also act as Dalal
for formal private clinics, receiving payment according
to the number of patients referred, or in other cases, a
percentage of service charges. A private clinic manager
from Dhaka explained the importance of this strategy:
Many patients are referred (through agents or brokers). Relatives of a patient who have received services
from us (in the past), may also increase publicity. (In
return) we give them services at low cost.
Public sector providers are similarly known to act as
middlemen, referring patients to their own private practices or those in which they are shareholders. In other
instances, providers described referring patients to other
private facilities and, like Dalal, receiving a commission for referral. While some of these referrals may be
clinically indicated, a number of stakeholders reported
that this practice of ‘referral for commission’ was widespread among private sector doctors, diagnostic centres
5
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motivations helps clarify the strategies the sector employs
in maintaining their healthcare business and how they
might be leveraged to increase access to the urban poor.
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Suppose, I am an owner of a diagnostic centre. Many
brokers are available to me. I will tell them to collect
patients from wherever they can, (and) they will be
given a percentage. If, a doctor sends patients to me
for pathology (testing), I will give him a 40% or 50%
commission. If I get 2000 taka (USD 23.72) by doing
the pathology, then 1000 (USD 11.86) taka is for me
and the other 1000 (USD 11.86) is for the doctor –
the doctor is happy, and so am I. If 10 patients are
sent daily, he will receive 10,000 BDT (USD 118.59).
(Likewise), if I refer patients to the doctor’s facility,
he will send patients to my diagnostic service for tests.
Although these practices were perceived to increase
patient flow, several stakeholders noted how referrals
orchestrated by brokers may be disadvantageous to the
urban poor. Diverting patients away from free government
services towards private sector providers, brokers effectively increased the cost of care and the patient’s financial
burden and even more when treatment is unnecessary.
Another practice that nurtures the market environment for private sector services was the close relationship
with pharmaceutical companies. Nearly all private practitioners described regular visits from pharmaceutical
representatives on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis
with the purpose of marketing their products. They also
reported receiving incentives to buy and prescribe certain
drugs, although this practice is prohibited by the Government’s Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices, which
states that ‘no gift or financial inducement shall be
offered or given to members of the medical profession
for purposes of sales or promotion’.27 Incentives in the
form of money, drug samples and gifts were received
routinely, and many admitted their influence on prescription patterns. As one clinic owner explained:
… month after month, different companies pay doctors for recommending their medicines… even giving
cash…now if doctors recommend (these drugs), we
have little choice (but to keep them in our store)…
Another provider from Sylhet described how the ubiquitous presence of pharmaceutical representatives had
effectively changed his prescription practices:
I generally prescribe those medicines which work
effectively; still there are some influences such as
medical representatives (who) come frequently. They
come in the morning, in the evening, automatically we need to keep their medicines …we use those,
prescribe those, but we don’t (always) get to check
ourselves whether they work or not.
This strategy of cultivating and sustaining provider
loyalty is carefully calculated, as one pharmaceutical
representative in Khulna recounted:
6

I see which pharmaceutical company’s medicine the
doctor is prescribing… We get data from different
sources. Some are paid 1 00 000 taka (USD 1185.95)
annually, or 3000 (USD 35.58) to 5000 taka (USD
59.30) monthly… then I request him (doctor) to
kindly give me a chance and make him a monetary
offer. If he agrees then I provide him the agreed
amount monthly or yearly. Then he writes our drug
in the prescription.
A number of key stakeholders expressed concern
about the consequences of pharmaceutical influence on
patients, including the development of antibiotic resistance and financial impoverishment by obliging patients
to purchase expensive and sometimes unneeded medicines. Private sector providers were also aware of the
negative consequences of aggressive pharmaceutical
marketing such as the prescription of low-quality drugs,
and some expressed concern that decisions about what
drugs to stock may be determined by price and discounts
received and not what is best for the patient in terms
of treatment efficacy. As one pharmaceutical company
manager explained, sometimes drugs purveyed by pharmaceutical reps are not even intended for the local
market:
Sometimes they (medical representatives) they sell a
product not meant for local sale to medicine shops at
a discounted rate […] then motivate drug sellers and
doctors not to sell another company’s product as they
will not get any benefit from them.
Interestingly, several private sector providers justified
their relationship with pharmaceutical representatives by
explaining their practice of passing on free drug samples
to patients with less capacity to pay—for prices well below
standard rates.
Organisational capabilities
Many respondents noted the continual challenge of
ensuring adequate, trained human resources in an increasingly competitive urban healthcare market. A consequent
practice by private clinics was the use of medical staff from
the public sector as consultants for specialist and general
services. Duty doctors were most often medical staff with
less experience, including honorary trainees, postgraduate medical students and occasionally interns. As office
hours in public hospitals typically extend from 08:00 to
14:00, in theory, public sector doctors that engage in
private sector practice are only available later in the day.
As one clinic owner from Sylhet noted, staff shortages and
the provision of specialised services in particular were
therefore limited during morning hours: ‘The consultants
are mostly from the public medical college. So, we face this (doctor
shortage) problem from 8:00am-3:00pm.’
Other respondents noted that the practice of
public sector doctors attending patients at private facilities during office hours was not uncommon, with a clinic
manager from Dhaka, asserting: ‘It is not ethical that, in
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and clinics and used to boost revenue through collusion. A top-ranked government health officer in Khulna
described the involvement of doctors in referral and the
financial benefits that are accrued:

Open access

It is impossible for me to keep 6 nurses (on staff);
it is not possible for any clinic to give 60 000 taka
(USD 711.57) for their salary (10 000 taka each,
USD 118.59). Maybe it is possible for (large private
hospitals like) Apollo and Square, but not for me.
(Instead) we must hire secondary school certificate
girls and train them on the job…
In circumstances when a private sector clinic is unable
to handle a complicated case due to lack of capacity,
referral to public hospitals and medical colleges was
justified. Respondents noted this practice was especially
common among patients requiring specialty care or
those with emergent, deteriorating or potentially fatal
health conditions. Several providers further noted the
reputational risk in being held responsible for a patient’s
death and hence the reliance on referral as a strategy to
avoid potential fatalities that might damage their professional reputation or that of the facility in which they
work. Referral shifted responsibility for potential accusations of malpractice to the receiving facility, which most
commonly was the city’s public hospital. As one private
sector owner/provider from Khulna admitted, ‘We don’t
take the risk of keeping critical patients. They are referred to the
Adams AM, et al. BMJ Open 2019;9:e026586. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026586

Government Hospital, where there are ICU facilities, or to larger
private hospitals based on their (financial) ability’.
This widespread practice highlights broader limitations
in critical care capacity within urban areas that need to be
addressed.28 29 It can also exacerbate the vulnerability of
the urban poor, as the referral destination is often determined based on ability to pay. Even if a private hospital
is closest, many providers stated that they were more apt
to refer poorer patients to public facilities or medical
colleges, while better-off patients were sent to closer
private facilities. Patient’s desires, frequently motivated
by perceived quality of services, was a further factor influencing referral patterns. More virtuous behaviour was
also reported. Some providers stated that their referral
decisions were based on the quality of care provided at
the receiving facility, and several claimed that instead of
taking commissions from referral facilities, they asked
that patient discounts be provided instead.
Interestingly, almost all of the respondents in the
study acknowledged that the absence of a formalised
referral system contributed to poor health outcomes and
described the challenge of patients arriving too late for
effective treatment. Suggestions were also made that a
formal referral system be implemented to assist primary
providers in ensuring patients be directed to appropriate
levels of care.
Discussion
This exploratory study is among the first in Bangladesh
to query the underlying motivations and strategies of
the urban private for-profit sector and their implications
for healthcare quality and accessibility. However, certain
limitations must be acknowledged. The most challenging
of these was the reluctance of some private sector respondents to divulge details about the strategies they employ
to grow their business. In other instances, respondents
may have constructed their replies in a socially desirable
manner to mitigate judgement about the business strategies they employ, especially if unethical or informal
practises were revealed. Although efforts were made to
maximise trust by approaching respondents through
personal contacts and social networks, richer and more
trustworthy data might have been produced had a
lengthier period of rapport building been possible. While
a risk of selection bias was inherent in our approach,
this was justified given our concern that private sector
respondents would not divulge their business strategies
to strangers. Selection bias may also have occurred in exit
interviews as clients may have been more inclined to give
a positive evaluation of the quality of care received at the
time of discharge.
An interesting first insight emerging from analysis was
the complexity of motivations prompting involvement in
the private for-profit sector. IDIs with owners, managers
and providers challenged widespread perceptions that
financial interests are the singular driving force for
engagement in private healthcare business. Rather, public
7
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some clinics of this area, the doctors and trainees of the Government Medical College see patients in between office hours’,
One common strategy to overcome doctor shortages
during daytime hours was the use of on-call doctors.
These doctors typically practice in public sector facilities in close proximity to a private sector clinic that
relies on their services and will respond to calls when
needed. As one clinic owner (and provider) from Sylhet
explained: ‘Within a few minutes we come to see the patients.
Within five to ten minutes the specialist also comes here. If we
are informed we come here from anywhere. Or another specialist
comes to manage everything’.
This strategy was popular among private clinic owners
given its perceived cost savings over standard practices
of recruiting and paying the salaries of three doctors to
cover a 24-hour service or having to hire specialist doctors
full time when their services are not always needed. It was
also noted that the strategy was not without hazards. Given
that many private clinics rely on commonly performed
surgeries (C-sections and appendectomies) to ensure
financial sustainability, in the context of life-threatening
complications, reliance on on-call doctors who are located
off-site may substantially heighten risk to patients.
Recruiting and retaining qualified nurses was also
identified as a major challenge by many private sector
respondents. As a result, nursing care was often provided
by unqualified or untrained persons such as cleaners
and ayas who are meant to provide non-technical caregiving support to patients and their families. According
to private sector respondents, the reliance on unqualified
personnel was due to the dearth of qualified nurses on
the market and the high salaries they command. As one
clinic owner from Dhaka despaired:
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referral fees to doctors who direct their patients to
preferred private sector clinics.30 In both cases, these
practices are only effective market strategies if the costs
incurred amplify profit. It was unclear, however, whether
such calculations were made, and the extent to which
they end up being subsidised by patient out-of-pocket
expenditures.7
The role of pharmaceutical agents in shaping the
market environment and the prescription practices of
private sector doctors was also widely acknowledged. Many
private sector respondents valued the incentives that they
receive from pharmaceutical companies, some of which
are passed onto patients, such as discounted prices on
‘free’ medicine samples. A few others expressed concerns
that the medicines pushed by pharmaceutical representatives were expensive or unknown in terms of efficacy. The
adverse influence of pharmaceutical incentives on private
sector business has been emphasised by others,40–42 and
it is well recognised that aggressive marketing strategies
undermine patient safety and ethical medical conduct
and need firm regulation.40–44
Capacity constraints related to human resources, especially of nursing staff and specialist doctors, were almost
universally identified by private sector respondents. At
the same time, concerns related to the costs of keeping
full-time staff were also acknowledged. A variety of
workaround strategies were reported to overcome gaps
and minimise costs such as the use of on-call specialists
from the public sector, reliance on doctors in training
or recent medical graduates, as well as filling sector-wide
short-falls in the number of nurses through onsite and
unregulated nurse training to unqualified personnel. The
implications of these adaptive mechanisms in terms of
quality and costs to the public health system and patient
safety warrant assessment. Moreover, these strategies
provide insights into some of drivers of the widespread
phenomena of ‘dual practice’ that many health systems
struggle to manage from cost, quality and accountability
perspectives.13 30 45 46
Other strategies employed to overcome capacity limitations included the referral of complicated cases to public
sector tertiary facilities. Several respondents noted that
the absence of a formal urban referral system inclusive
of both private and public sectors heightens patient risk
as inappropriate or late referrals may result. The development of a system that identifies the fastest and safest
route to appropriate critical care services, whatever the
location, represents a critical area for policy attention.
This includes the transfer of patient information so that
expensive diagnostic tests are not needlessly repeated,47
enhanced capacity for first aid services to ensure that
patients are stabilised during transport and the availability of proximate and effective ambulatory services.
Although our study was focused on so-called ‘formal’
small to medium-sized private health facilities in urban
Bangladesh, striking was the degree to which ‘informality’
characterised most aspects of their business model ranging
from the way prices were levied, health workers deployed
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service, social status and family obligation figured prominently alongside profit and financial security as factors
motivating participation. Leveraging these non-financial motivations might serve to further encourage social
responsibility in the sector or potential participation in
health financing schemes that aim to increase affordable
healthcare access to the urban poor. That being said,
private sector engagement is ultimately contingent on
success in turning a profit.30 In other words, the scope for
market expansion must be sufficient to support lower per
patient revenues typically associated with fee for service
and prepayment schemes.31–33
In this paper, the analysis of strategies was usefully
structured around the BPM.24 25 As the model specifies,
in order to deliver a profitable value proposition, private
healthcare actors must employ strategies that enable
a best fit between the products or services offered, the
market environment and their organisation’s capabilities.
In this discussion, we consider each of these components
to gain insight about the complex ecosystem in which the
urban private sector is located and the manner in which
business interests are pursued within a competitive healthcare market. Of particular interest is how the strategies
employed are conducive to achieving greater efficiency,
equity or scale and their implications for Bangladesh’s
broader policy goals in support of UHC.
As regards products and services, there was a near-consensus viewpoint among study respondents about the
necessity of providing patient-friendly services and
making patients ‘happy’. These objectives appear to be
backed up by a range of ‘patient-loyalty’ strategies that
included ‘good’ provider behaviour, the discretionary
use of discounts on consultation fees, drugs and procedures and offering extended service hours convenient
to the working population. Interestingly, however, exit
interviews with patients revealed that consultation time
was only slightly longer than public sector facilities and
did not appear to be an important factor influencing
patient perceptions of quality.34 These results correspond with global evidence that patients are willing to
pay for private healthcare if they perceive providers are
respectful and responsive to their needs35 36 and that
good provider–patient relations increase the likelihood
of sustained treatment seeking,37 38 and attracting new
clientele. Indeed, adapting service pricing and delivery
modalities to the needs and preferences of healthcare
customers is emblematic of private sector practice globally.39 This behaviour can be explained by the aspiration
to gain and sustain market share through customer loyalty
when other private sector actors or NGOs may be offering
lower cost services.
To ensure their position in a crowded healthcare
market, many private sector respondents indicated their
reliance on brokers and agents. Referral fees paid to
these middlemen ensured a fresh client flow and competitive advantage. Among those ‘captured’ were patients
diverted from government facilities where services are
free. Very similar was the widespread practice of offering

Open access

Adams AM, et al. BMJ Open 2019;9:e026586. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-026586

low-income and middle-income countries characterised
by increasing urban healthcare demand, a growing private
sector and a weak regulatory environment.52 However, the
need remains for nuanced ethnographic work that examines the particularities of a highly diverse sector and the
unique manner in which products, markets and capacity
are aligned to sustain successful business.53 Understanding these complexities and the larger ecosystem in
which the private sector operates will lend itself to policies that are fit for purpose and effective in harnessing
supply and ensuing quality and affordable access to the
urban poor.

Conclusion
In urban Bangladesh, the private for-profit sector plays
a crucial role in meeting a growing demand for healthcare in a context of limited public provision. Within this
massive, heterogeneous yet predominantly informal range
of providers, small and medium-sized private clinics and
hospitals are important purveyors of so-called ‘formal’
healthcare services. Focusing on the motivations and strategies undergirding urban private healthcare business, our
findings confirm prevailing assumptions about the sector’s
profit orientation, informality and sometimes deleterious
practices. At the same time, certain strategies yield benefits to healthcare consumers like the sector’s emphasis on
responsive, patient-friendly services. Given the weak regulatory capacity of national and local authorities and professional associations alike, the provision of incentives that
promote greater accountability within the private for-profit
sector and reward efforts to increase the affordability and
quality of services may be a more realistic strategy towards
UHC. Support in extending the private sector’s largely
curative focus to include preventive and promotive services
is also critical given the lacunae of primary care services in
urban areas. Most importantly, policies that support UHC
within the realities of a highly pluralistic health market must
accommodate the financial interests of this massive, diverse
and growing private sector. Policies and programmes that
encourage private sector quality and effectiveness, and
enable even greater market share, may function to drive out
the subset of private sector players whose business model
relies on overcharging, oversupplying or providing substandard care.
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and business hours set. Not a single respondent indicated
the existence of a written business plan or even standard
operating procedures to guide the day-to-day or longer term
development of services. Similarly lacking was a formal or
standardised system of reporting on the volume, quality or
costs of services provided. Paradoxically, ‘professional reputation’—subjectively or tacitly determined by the ‘public’—
was noted as critical to sustaining a successful healthcare
business. In short, we observed a variety of stopgap strategies that align services, market environment and are illustrative of a sector that is getting by but with little apparent
emphasis on achieving greater efficiency or scale.
This qualitative exploration of the motivations and
business strategies of those involved in small and medium-sized urban private for-profit healthcare delivery
offers insight on how this sector might be harnessed
more effectively towards the broader national policy aims
of UHC. Features of the sector that represent strengths
or positive assets include professed motivations of service,
patient-centredness and responsiveness, innovative
approaches to pricing, sensitivity to differential ability
to pay and the desire to maintain a professional reputation within the healthcare market. These features have
established the sector’s legitimacy and dominance in the
urban context and account for its popularity as a source
of care.30 39 45 They also align to some degree with UHC
goals of affordable access to quality healthcare without
risk of financial harm.
At the same time, certain adverse practices exist that
are contrary to Bangladesh’s aspirations for UHC.48
Patient brokers and pharmaceutical incentives are likely
to lead to oversupply of services and overprescription
that do not match with needs and may promote public
health threats such as antimicrobial resistance.49 Furthermore, staffing models that rely on part-time, junior and
unregulated training pose serious problems with quality
and safety of services. From an affordability perspective,
accessibility among the poorest segments of the population is unclear, and the pay-per-service model of provision
is likely to strain household budgets and push significant
numbers into poverty.50 51
Given the size and centrality of this sector to urban
health in Bangladesh.,20 23 the policy conundrum becomes
how best to amplify strengths and shore-up shortfalls
of this important segment of the urban health system.
Perhaps the most challenging attribute of the sector is its
inherent informality in a broader health systems context
that is also characterised by weak governance, particularly
in urban areas. This context argues against sweeping de
jure regulatory reforms on multiple fronts as they are
highly unlikely to be implemented in any meaningful way.
Rather, more discrete, focused efforts on specific parts of
the sector, that is, pharmaceutical prescription practices
that engage the principal actors in changing behaviours,
may be more effective in nudging the private sector more
towards the goals of UHC.
While our findings are appropriately contextualised
for urban Bangladesh, they also resonate with other
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